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FOREWORD 
One of the regions that has been hardest hit by the economic crisis 
affecting Latin America over the past few years is the Central 
American Isthmus. Its six small agricultural exporting countries 
depend more than others on the ups and downs of the international 
economy. These circumstances are moreover accompanied by certain 
negative internal factors, prominent among which are the social and 
political tensions affecting most of the countries in question and 
Central America as a whole,, 
The origins, scope and consequences of the economic crisis 
have been explored -at least in general- by the ECLAC Secretariat,1/ 
A detailed examination has not however been made of the considerable 
number of secondary effects caused by the crisis in many aspects of 
national endeavour. One of these, which is briefly analysed in the 
present document, refers to the consequences of the crisis in the 
formulation and execution of economic policies as well as in action 
taken by the public sector in general and in the sphere of planning 
in particular. 
According to consultations and inquiries made by the ECLAC 
Office in Mexico among the planning agencies in the Central American 
Isthmus, the multiplicity of direct and indirect consequences of the 
economic crisis appear to have had a debilitating effect on those 
agencies precisely at a time when their role has been more necessary 
considering the imperative need to raise the efficiency of production 
and government expenditure, apply selective austerity policies, put 
forward creative proposals to assist the countries in adapting to 
the new international conditions and lastly to reduce the economic 
and social cost of the crisis and attain the desired recovery and 
growth. 
1/ See, in particular, CEPAL, La Crisis en Centroamérica: 
Orígenes, alcances y consecuencias (E/CEPAL/MEX/1983/R.3/Rev.1), 
September 1983. 
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Planning experiences in the sub-region reveal a heterogeneous 
panorama as a whole and in each component country at different 
times. In the institutional sphere, some organisms hold ministerial 
rank while others operate as technical secretaryships. In conceptual 
terms some governments have assigned high priority to the role of 
the State in directing the development process and have given full 
political support to their respective planning agencies, wheresas 
others have adopted a somewhat passive attitude, entrusting them 
with comparatively routine duties. In terms of technical quality 
some organisms have acquired a certain level of excellence -which 
has enhanced their ability to influence economic policy decisions-
while others suffer from a weakness of resources. All in all, 
however, the effects of the economic crisis have brought about 
some sufficiently universal consequences in the planning systems 
to enable some lessons of broad scope to be derived from the 
developing situation. 
The present document, after dealing in the first chapter 
with some considerations of a general character, presents in the 
second a brief review of the main characteristics of the economic 
crisis. The third chapter examines on the one hand the institutional 
position of the planning organisms in the sub-region -including 
the most recently-introduced legal amendments- and on the other 
their functional and characteristic features in "normal" times, 
such as prior to the crisis. The fourth chapter analyses some of 
the direct and indirect consequences of the economic crisis in the 
performance of the planning agencies and, finally, the fifth chapter 
summarizes these general findings and puts forward some conclusions 
and recommendations. 
This report has been drawn up at the request of the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) and 
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forms part of the documentation prepared for the V Conference of 
Ministers and Heads of Planning of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The attention of some readers may be drawn to -he emphasis given 
in the text to the fact that the planning agencies in the Region 
have been losing some ground in recent times. This is not,, however, 
the purpose of the present note. The desired aim is rather to 
provoke discussion in the context of the Conference with a view to 
bringing to the notice of participating organisms points of view 
that may assist them to regain the space of responsibility which 
is not only their rightful due but which is at the present time 
more than ever necessary considering the difficult task of stimulating 
the economies on perhaps different but more equitable lines than 
hitherto. 
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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Which are the criteria that should be applied in assessing the 
degree of efficiency of a planning system? To what extent does the 
the prevailing economic situation affect the application of those 
criteria? 
An answer to these questions will not prove easy and will 
be influenced by a high degree of subjectivity. On the other 
hand, due to variations between one country and another as well as 
within each at differing times, generalizations will not be 
admissible in endeavouring to qualify the experiences of a group 
of countries such as those of the Central American Isthmus. 
For the purpose of this analysis some general characteristics 
have been established which in one form or another condition the 
degree of efficacy of a planning system,2/ this, being understood, 
in the context of a mixed State/private economy, as a regulatory 
instrument of economic policy and a definer of public action.3/ 
2/ These systems include the formal planning agencies and 
sectional units, budget offices and other government departments 
linked with planning. 
3/ For a more comprehensive definition of the concept of 
planning, see: Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic 
and Social Planning, La planificación y la política económica en 
América Latina y el Caribe, 1980-1982, Cuaderno del ILPES No. 30, 
Santiago, Chile, 1984, pages 12 and 13, which among other aspects 
describes planning as a procedure used by the Stat^ to define the 
conjunction of objectives deliberately sought in connection with 
the process of development over a given period of time. Added is 
the statement that planning has been associated with the established 
organization of a combination of procedures relating to the 
adoption of government decisions with regard to the design and 
execution of economic and social policies in order to achieve 
legally-planned objectives. It is further suggested that, in a 
broad sense, planning has been instituted as a rational and co-
ordinated process in the adoption of decisions which in most instances 
call for reforms in the institutional organization of the State and 
tend to establish planning and co-ordination agencies and units at 
different levels. 
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The characteristics in question are as follows: 
a) The conceptual (or ideological) orientation of the 
government of which the planning system forms part, and that of 
the planning organism itself, especially in terms of its functions 
and attributes. In principle, the greater the importance attached 
to the role of the State as a decisive factor in development, the 
greater will be the predisposition to favour guidance by the public 
sector of the activities of other economic agents.4/ At the same 
time, in the conceptual framework of the government of which it 
forms part -and notwithstanding the field of responsibilities 
formally assigned to it by law- the planning organism may have its 
own views concerning its duties in the constellation of institutions 
comprising the public sector. 
b) The degree of political support received by the planning 
system, its hierarchical situation within the public sector, and 
its formal attitudes and relations with the rest of the public 
administration as well as with private enterprise and the interna-
tional community. Is it of the nature of a "super-ministry" able 
to "impose" co-ordination on other ministries?, or is its position 
that of a ministry of equal status with others? or, on the other 
hand, that of a secretarial office of inferior status to that of 
other cabinet departments? Does it maintain relations with groups 
or entities outside the public sector and, if so, of what kind? 
Is it in touch with international organism and, if so, which? 
Answers to these question will serve to assess the efficacy of the 
planning system; 
_4/ This does not imply that the planning system should "impose" 
its directives on other sectors within or outside the government. 
Experience in the Region has in fact suggested that the more success-
ful systems are those that are able to harmonize interests and points 
of view in support of attainment of the desired aims. 
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c) A final characteristic in this context is the technical 
proficiency of the officials employed in the system, and even the 
personal qualifications of its director or senior members. Aspects 
of this kind may have a decisive effect on the ability of the 
system to influence government decisions. The capacity to reconcile 
urgent short-term aims and thereby effectively direct the process 
is, for instance, a task calling for a combination of technical 
qualities and political backing. 
Thus, in examining the effect of problems arising from the 
crisis in the role of economic planning, an attempt will be made 
in the first place to determine the characteristics of the planning 
systems in operation in the Region in the second half of the 1970s 
(a period of comparative "normalcy") and subsequently analyse the 
nature of those characteristics immediately prior to the crisis. 
As will be seen, the result has not necessarily been similar 
in all instances since the crisis has affected the various countries 
in different ways -although its effects will have been negative in 
almost all cases. For example, although the vulnerability of the 
economies will no doubt be seen to have grown and the effects of 
the already long-drawn-out recessive period to have contracted the 
scope for manoeuvre in the application of economic policy (thereby 
implying a weakening of planning possibilities), the demands of 
the crisis itself -greater efficiency, austerity and selectivity-
have hightened the need for orderly and programmed public action. 
Following the same train of thought, despite the existence 
of a certain criterion in the field of external financial co-operation, 
and especially among certain bilateral sources, in favour of 
leaving the allocation of resources free to respond to market 
forces, and in general, of reducing the incidence of government 
activity in the economy, the need for more cautious financial 
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programming (and in many cases that of rephasing the existing 
public debt) involves new responsibilities which in some countries 
have been entrusted to the planning system. 
The present review explores the characteristics of the 
planning systems of the six countries of the Central American 
Isthmus applying the several yardsticks already described. An 
attempt is also made to determine the manner in which the problems 
deriving from the crisis have affected those characteristics and 
hence the role of planning. 
With differences of degree the crisis has manifested itself 
primarily in growing internal and external financial imbalances. 
International monetary reserves having become exhausted, as well 
as the possibility of obtaining a larger net flow of external 
resources, the countries have attempted to correct those setbacks 
by restricting imports and government expenditure, with consequent 
adverse effects in the general level of economic activity and of 
employment. 
Since 1981 the typical panorama throughout the Region reveals 
-with some variations- important current-account and balance of 
payments deficits combined with acute shortages of foreign exchange 
and even greater difficulties in serving the accumulated foreign 
debt; deficits in government finances; a severe drop in savings 
and public and private investment; descending levels of economic 
activity; growing open and concealed unemployment, and a contraction 
in real wages not so much as the result of intense inflationary 
pressures -since, with the exception of Nicaragua, and of Costa 
Rica in 1981 and 1982, price variations in the Central American 
region have been comparatively moderate- but of contraction or a 
virtual stagnation of nominal wages. In the political and social 
fields the crisis has generated profound transformations in some 
countries and aggravated secular tensions in others. It has also 
given rise to new international pressures. All these factors have 
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provoked a marked and unaccustomed turbulance in all respects in 
each and every country of the sub-region. 
The above-mentioned developments, while not reducing the 
importance of planning -the contrary in fact having been the case-
have posed fresh demands which the Region's planning systems have 
found themselves unable to satisfy. The present document refers 
specifically, though briefly, to the subject as to how those systems 
have reacted in the face of the crisis and have influenced its 
evolution. Among the effects of these developments on economic 
planning, the following deserve particular mention: 
a) The principal task of the planning systems in the Central 
American Isthmus -namely that of co-ordinating attitudes within 
the governments and between them and other economic aspects- has 
become considerably more complex due to the new tensions and 
disagreements typical of a period of generalized recession. The 
crisis has in this sense had a "dispersing" effect on one of the 
inherent activities of planning systems. 
b) The most noticeable manifestation of the crisis has 
occurred in the financial sphere, above all in public finances and 
in the management of external imbalances. Priority attention in 
terms of economic policy has thus been diverted towards the financial 
areas (as distinct from the productive sectors) and towards short-
term rather than medium or long-term economic policy. The planning 
systems which have concerned themselves with these matters (the 
management of the cyclical situation) or have attempted to reconcile 
the short-term with longer-term prospects are those that have 
managed to maintain or even improve their relative status; others 
have tended to lose their relative significance vis-a-vis other 
government sector -finance ministries and central banks- tradition-
ally linked with financial, foreign exchange and credit policies. 
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c) A notably unusual feature in this respect is to be found 
in the programming of public expenditure, and especially in that 
of public investment. In most of the regional countries the formu-
lation and subsequent evaluation of execution of public investment 
plans represent outstanding activities in the work of the planning 
organism. As a result of the considerable reduction of programmes 
of this kind a pronounced inconsistency has been generated between 
the aims of formal development plans and events as foreseen in 
annual budgets; the relative importance of public investment 
programming tending in any case to diminish. The planning systems 
most involved in this type of activity and less able to adapt 
rapidly to the changing circumstances have been those tending to 
lose their effectiveness in the context of their respective 
economic cabinets. 
d) Another typical aspect of the phenomenon described has 
been the appearance of a task barely considered before the onset 
of the crisis consisting of a much more rigorous control of policies 
in the sphere of external indebtedness and in the rephasing of debt 
maturities, a task to which a high degree of priority has been 
assigned in economic policy. It is significant that concerns of 
this nature have not been entrusted to any of the official planning 
systems in the Central American sub-region although in some cases 
(Nicaragua and Panama) they are now taking part. 
e) Another fundamental characteristic of the crisis is 
noticeable in the uncertainty surrounding any forecasting exercise. 
Factors outside the control of the governments of the Central 
American Isthmus but which nevertheless have a decidedly direct 
effect on the possible evolution of their economies, are so 
numerous -most being of foreign origin and some of a non-economic 
character- that those organisms which continue to formulate plans 
based on forecasts leading to quantitative goals whose fulfilment 
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is encouraged, are running the risk of becoming increasingly 
disconnected with local realities, 
f) The dynamics arising from the crisis -i.e., rapidly 
changing internal and external variables- have as a rule restrained 
the planning systems from adapting to new circumstances as rapidly 
as desired, and only on few occasions have they been able to take 
advance action such as alerting their governments or proposing 
appropriate counter measures. The systems that have shown greater 
flexibility and pragmatism in adapting to changing conditions are 
those that have performed most effectively. 
g) The economic crisis has been profound and long-lasting. 
In the case of Central America it has also coincided with a political 
crisis. Patterns valid for the entire post-war period have been 
destroyed, their place being taken by confusion and bewilderment. 
The planning systems have not been immune from such trends and have 
perhaps been more affected than other executive agencies in their 
respective governments. Another of their traditional attributes 
has after all been that of proposing orientations and guidelines 
for the future. The very fact of having to admit a degree of 
confusion has in many cases deprived them of legitimate partic-
ipation; and 
h) Finally, the force of circumstances has imposed on 
governments and planning organisms the need to readjust their 
priorities. Conventional and traditional objectives of all develop-
ment processes -growth, improvement of income distribution, 
reduction of external vulnerability- have given way to more modest 
aims -e.g. the avoidance of deterioration- in the light of impla-
cable realities and evidence that the crisis has been acting in 
a diametrically opposite direction from that of formerly envisaged 
attainments. Here again the planning systems that have managed 
more effectively to balance their long-term objectives with 
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current recessive realities have been those acquiring a stronger 
position in the conduct of economic policy. 
Some cases have occurred of planning systems deliberately 
ignoring the crisis and taking refuge in the theory that at least 
one government department should maintain a medium and long-term 
view in order to ensure a minimum degree of coherence between 
stabilization or adjustment programmes and the demands of long-
term economic development. Some efforts -mostly limited in 
character- to explore optional development strategies have received 
priority attention on the part of these systems, but often at 
the cost of exclusion from the central concerns of those entrusted 
with formulating economic policy. 
A brief examination will be made in the following chapters 
of the manner in which each of the above-described effects of the 
crisis has impinged on the planning systems of the Central American 
Isthmus in the period 1980-1984 and their effect on some of the 
central characteristics of those systems. 
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II. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Although the characteristics and scope of the profound and prolonged 
economic crisis faced by the countries of the Central American 
Isthmus have been somewhat different in each, they have followed 
the same general pattern, thereby enabling some across-the-board 
conclusions to be reached.5/ 
During the relatively long period between 1950 and 1970 the 
six economies of the Central American Isthmus achieved sustained 
and comparatively dynamic rates of economic expansion together with 
significant transformations in their respective productive structures. 
The average annual increment exceeded 5% -Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
surpassing this average with Honduras recording a slightly lower 
level, while Panama exceeded an average of 6%. (See Table 1 and 
Figure 1.) 
In the same period the relative participation of secondary 
and tertiary activities rose considerably at the expense of a 
reduction in the primary category which nevertheless rose at a 
higher rate than demographic growth. A perceptible urbanization 
process took place in all the countries concerned as well as a 
growing relative importance of the middle-income strata together 
with a wider differentiation between extreme income levels. 
5/ For further details on this topic see: ECLA, Istmo 
Centroamericano: El carácter de la crisis económica actual, los 
desafíos que plantea y la cooperación internacional que demanda 
(E/CEPAL/CCE/402/Rev.1), August 1981; La crisis en Centroamérica ... 
op. cit., and Acumulación y financiamiento externo en Centroamérica, 
1950-1983 (E/CEPAL/MEX/1984/R.4), September 1984. 
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Table 1 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: RHYTHM OF GROWTH OF THE 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT a/ 
(Percentages) 




1950-1960 6.4 4.8 3.7 2.8 5.4 4.8 
1960-1970 5.9 5.5 5.2 5.0 6.5 7.8 
1970-1978 6.3 5.4 6.0 4.7 3.9 4.9 
1978-1983 -0.4 -4.6 0.8 1.7 -2.0 6.1 
Annual rates 
1970 7.2 3.4 5.5 3.5 -0.2 6.5 
1971 6.8 4.9 5.5 5.8 3.4 9.6 
1972 8.2 5.4 7.5 4.4 2.8 5.5 
1973 7.5 4.7 6.6 5.8 5.3 6.2 
1974 5.4 6.7 6.1 -0.3 13.5 3.8 
1975 2.2 5.8 2.4 -3.1 1.5 2.3 
1976 5.5 3.1 7.6 6.5 5.8 1.9 
1977 8.5 6.1 7.4 9.6 6.1 1.9 
1978 6.2 6 . 8 4.9 9.3 -5.9 8.4 
1979 5.3 -1.2 4.7 6.0 -24.5 6.1 
1980 0.9 -8.1 3.8 3.3 8.3 14.0 
1981 -2.3 -7.9 1.1 0.6 5.4 4.6 
1982 -7.1 -5.2 -3.3 -0.2 -0.6 6.2 
1983 2.3 -0.1 -2.0 -1.1 5.2 0.1 
1984 b/ 3.0 1.5 0.0 2.0 0.5 0.0 
Source: ECLAC, based on official figures 
a/ At constant 1970 prices, 
b/ Preliminary figures. 
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Figure 1 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS: GROWTH RATES OF 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Percentages) 
1980 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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Three key factors contributed to this result. In the first 
place, the main stimulus in the expansion process came from the 
exporting sector which recorded a rapid rate of growth and diver-
sification. In the second place the process of import-substitutive 
industrialization was strongly encouraged -in the Central American 
countries- by the effects of integration and, in the case of Panama, 
by expansion of the internal market. Finally, the third contributory 
impulse stemmed from capitalization efforts and public investment 
in particular. 
Despite the foregoing, the sub-region showed a marked tendency 
during this period to maintain latent financial imbalances in items 
of the external sector and fiscal deficits. Although such maladjust-
ments were more moderate in the case of other economic variables, 
their persistence and tendency to grow evidenced a structural weakness 
which kept the economies of the Isthmus in a state of precarious 
equilibrium. 
Moreover, the economies of the Isthmus in that period revealed 
themselves insufficiently able to attenuate accumulated lags in 
terms of satisfying basic needs and, despite an important expansion 
of government social services, deficiencies in the fields of health, 
education, employment and the general welfare of large social groups 
persisted, and in some cases became more acute.6/ 
6/ In this aspect, as in others, growing differences were to 
be observed between the component countries. For an analysis in 
this connection see ECLA, Satisfacción de las necesidades básicas 
de la población del Istmo Centroamericano (E/CEPAL/MEX/1983/L.32), 
November 1983, and Notas sobre la evolución del desarrollo social del 
Istmo Centroamericaño~hasta 1980 (E/CEPAL/MEX/1982/L.26/Rev.1/Corr.1), 
September 1982. 
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Between 1970 and 1978 the sub-regional economies continued to 
record a satisfactory, though lower, average rate of growth in the 
context of increasing financial instability. The first signs of 
weakness in growth-stimulating factors became perceptible, and 
external developments began at that time to influence events more 
severely, especially in the form of imbalances in the balance of 
payments and public finances as well as internal price systems. 
To make matters worse, several national disasters occurred,7y 
provoking considerable human and economic losses. Finally, new 
phenomena of external origin, including a considerable rise in 
hydrocarbon prices as well as inflationary tensions at the inter-
national level. These factors coincided with a marked instability 
of prices receivable for the region's main export products and 
caused a significant and prolonged deterioration in the countries' 
terms of trade. (See Table 2.) 
However, with the exception of Panama, the traditional export 
sector continued to gain ground, and public investment rose in the 
six countries -especially in Panama- as the result of incurring 
considerable expenditure in order to substitute petroleum imports 
1_/ See ECLA, Report on the damages of the earthquake in the 
city of Managua and its adverse effects on the Nicaraguan economy 
(E/CN.12/AC.64/2/Rev.1), 13 January 1973; Informe sobre los daños y 
repercusiones del Huracán Fifi en la economía hondureña (C/CEPAL/ 
AC.67/2/Rev.1), October 1974; Daños causados por el terremoto de 
Guatemala y sus repercusiones sobre el desarrollo económico y social 
del país (CEPAL/MEX/7 4/Guat.1), February 1976; Nicaragua: Repercusiones 
económicas de los acontecimientos políticos recientes (E/CEPAL/G.1091/ 
Rev.l), December 1979; Guatemala: Repercusiones de los fenómenos 
meteorológicos ocurridos en 1982 sobre la situación económica del 
país (E/CEPAL/MEX/1982/L.31), 24 November 1982, and Repercusiones 
de los fenómenos meteorológicos de 1982 sobre el desarrollo económico 
y social en Nicaragua (E/CEPAL/MEX/1983/L.l), 5 January 1983. 
Table 2 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS; SOME ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
(Percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984a 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product b/ 
Costa Rica 6.0 8.0 9.1 4.2 3.2 4.8 o o o 
El Salvador 1.7 1.0 5.5 7.4 8.1 9.6 © o o 
Guatemala 2.3 3.7 5.7 8.4 6.0 4.3 © g o 
Honduras 8.2 6.4 10.2 9.9 14.3 12.5 © o o 
Nicaragua 11.7 7.5 8.4 11.6 13.6 20.1 o o e 
Panama 9.7 15.8 10.6 11.1 18.3 9.6 
Public investment/gross domestic product c/ 
Costa Rica 7.5 8.9 9.1 7.0 5.2 5.7 o o o 
El Salvador 7.1 6.5 5.5 6.0 5.7 6.6 o o o 
Guatemala 4.1 4.2 5.1 6.8 5.6 3.8 o o o 
Honduras 10.5 8.7 8.9 8.0 7.3 7.4 O O 9 
Nicaragua 5.7 3.0 8.6 12.0 9.2 10.1 o o o 
Panama 11.7 6.7 8.3 7.4 9.4 7.7 
Service of external public debt/ 
exports of goods and services 
Costa Rica 18.1 17.9 21.0 26.5 26.3 55.2 o o o 
El Salvador 9.9 9.4 11.4 13.4 23.2 24.9 ... 
Guatemala 3.9 4.4 5.5 7.1 9.5 22.9 ... 
Honduras 9.5 13.5 11.7 15.2 18.9 16.2 ... 
Nicaragua 14.3 8.6 11.9 31.4 43.7 20.0d/ ... 
Panama 60.2 34.2 31.0 30.7 38.3 26.3 
Rates of growth of consumer prices e/ 
Costa Rica 6.0 9.2 18.1 37.0 90.1 32.6 14.0 
El Salvador 13.3 15.9 17.4 14.8 11.7 13.2 15.0 
Guatemala 7.9 11.5 10.7 11.4 0.2 4.7 4.0 
Honduras 5.7 12.1 18.1 9.4 9.4 8.9 6.5 
Nicaragua 4.6 48,2 35.3 23.9 24,8 31.1" 33.5 
Panama '4.2 7.9 13.8 7,3 4.2 2.1 
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Table 2 (Conclusion) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984a/ 
Growth rate of terms of foreign trade 
(goods and services) 
Costa Rica -15.5 -1.3 -2.5 -23.1 -9.2 -5.0 2.0 
El Salvador -22.4 -4.9 -12.2 -11.2 2.7 -0.2 0.4 
Guatemala -5.2 -14.0 -15.0 -12.1 -6.3 -0.6 
Honduras -0.6 7.5 2.0 -9.8 - - -0.8 
Nicaragua -11.9 -1.8 -3.0 -5.0 -9.3 -10.8 6^5 
Panama -3.4 -6.7 -4.9 1.2 -3.4 0.2 -8.4 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures, 
a/ Preliminary figures. 
b/ At current prices. 
c/ Based on figures at constant 1970 prices, 
d/ Excluding payments delayed in this year, 
e/ Based on annual averages. 
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by hydroelectric energy, and in some cases, to repair the damages 
caused by the natural disasters already referred to. 
The chief counter-effect of these continuing outlays of public 
funds was a rapid increment of external indebtedness (with differences 
of degree in each country), especially that contracted with private 
sources, taking advantage of the large availability of funds in the 
international banking system. 
Between 1977 and 1978 an important change took place in the five 
primarily affected Central American economies. From that time onwards 
they experienced a notable deceleration until reaching virtual 
stagnation in 1980. Panama recorded a modest recovery from 1977 
onwards (following a recession between 1974 and 1977) due to a revival 
of private investment and exports of services following the signing 
of the Torrijos-Carter agreement. This offered new prospects of 
development with the commencement of a progressive reversion of the 
Canal area to national control. 
Subsequently, as from 1981, the economies of the Central American 
Isthmus recorded fully and in generalized form the effects of the 
economic crisis characterized, among other aspects, by an abrupt 
contraction of productive activity (stagnation in the case of Panama) 
higher unemployment levels, acceleration in the growth of internal 
prices, important and growing imbalances in government finances and 
in the balance of payments, deterioration of real income affecting 
a large proportion of the population, internal difficulties in the 
supply of imported inputs (due to lack of foreign currency), financial 
deficiencies in certain productive enterprises, and disarray in the 
foreign-exchange and monetary markets (except in the case of Panama). 
The effects of the crisis have been different in intensity 
and scope in the various countries. El Salvador began to experience 
a contraction of the national product as from 1979 due mainly to 
disturbances arising from the social and political conflict (which 
- 20 -
still continues); Costa Rica has also been severely affected since 
the beginning of this period while Guatemala and Honduras, which 
were in a better relative international liquidity position, managed 
to delay the effects of contraction; the evolution of Nicaragua 
-after the spectacular fall in national production which occurred in 
1979- has been strongly influenced by efforts to revive and reorganize 
the economy. Performance in the case of Panama has been poor 
(stagnation over a two-year period) but without the severe reper-
cussions experienced in the other countries of the Region in view of 
the notably peculiar characteristics of the Panamanian economy. 
In the case of the five most affected Central American countries 
there is reason to believe that the roots of the recessive situation 
and disarticulation of the productive system are to be found in the 
superimposition of the effects of the international economic crisis 
on internal factors, which have tended to magnify them. In this 
connection it is argued that the drop in production began prior to 
the impact of international recession and that the imbalances in real 
terms and in the financial area have been aggravated to levels higher 
than in other Latin American economies. It would, moreover, 
apparently be more difficult to revert these circumstances. 
This situation is attributed to the fact that past expasionary 
factors -the external sector, industrialization and increasing 
investment- have shown a simultaneous recessive trend in which they 
have reinforced one another affected by various adverse elements, 
prominent among which are the structural imbalances which have been 
building up and the aggravation of political and social tensions. 
In addition, due to the slow response of tax earnings -and in 
an attempt to employ plublic expenditure as a means of compensating 
the recessive trends- the fiscal deficit became a serious hindrance 
in the context of economic policy, despite the fact that the adjust-
ment policies initially applied envisaged a drop in government 
expenditure, especially in investment. 
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To the above must be added that, as a consequence of growing 
external indebtedness previously undertaken and increasingly 
contracted with private sources (see Figure 2), the servicing costs 
of the foreign debt began significantly to affect the government 
budget and balance of payments until becoming one of the most severe 
obstacles in economic policy, especially during the two-year period, 
1983-1984, when the international banks showed themselves less 
ready to continue supplying fresh resources to the sub-region. 
Finally, non-economic factors continued to have an adverse 
effect, especially on the rhythm of productive activity, savings 
levels, and even on intra-regional trade. In addition, a consider-
able flight of capital, partly as the result of political and social 
tensions in the Region, further weakened the balance of payments and 
adversely affected investment and production. 
To sum up, since the beginning of the present decade the 
countries of the Isthmus, especially those in the Central American 
sub-region, have suffered a severe setback. Real income per inhabitant 
has diminished to the same level as in the early 1970s (at the 
beginning of the 1960s in the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador), 
open and concealed unemployment has notably increased, the economies 
find themselves severely hampered by an acute shortage of foreign 
currency due to a spectacular drop in terms of trade, a contraction 
of export volumes, an unexpectedly high increase in factor payments 
and the abrupt interruption of fresh external financing as from 
1982. The external imbalance has been accompanied by that of 
government finances and a significant deterioration in savings and 
investment, both public and private. This economic panorama has 
been common to all the countries concerned and has been additionally 
magnified by deterioration in the volume of reciprocal trade, thereby 
throwing light on the importance of the traditional economic inter-
dependence that has existed -and continues to exist- between the 
five Central American countries. 
Figure 2 
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III. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE OPERATING 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PLANNING SYSTEMS 
With a view to outlining the institutional framework of planning 
in the Central American Isthmus, its main characteristics and 
recent evolution, the present chapter deals in the first place 
with some general considerations regarding the origin and 
characteristics of the sub-region's central economic planning 
agencies, ending with a summary of the principal institutional 
changes introduced in recent years (1982-1984). Secondly, a brief 
analysis is made of operational aspects of planning in the period 
prior to the economic crisis. 
1. Institutional particulars 
a) General aspects 
The origins of the practice of economic planning in the 
Central American Isthmus, strongly influenced by the concepts 
disseminated at the time by ECLA, date back in most of the 
component countries to the 1950s, and only in two instances was 
the process instituted in the early years of the subsequent 
decade.8/ Since then planning has acquired ever greater significance 
in the light of the role assigned to it by official financial 
organisms, especially in the context of the Alliance for Progress. 
During the early post-war period interest arose among 
international institutions in the promotion of balanced and 
sustained growth in the world's poorer economies. This concern 
found expression in the organization of multilateral institutions 
8/ Nicaragua (1952) , Guatemala (1954), Honduras (1955) , 
Panama (1959) , El Salvador (1962) and Costa Rica (1963). 
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and mechanisms devoted to financial and technical co-operation 
which confirmed the need for the various countries to draw up 
global development proposals and put forward consistent investment 
projects appropriate to the situation in each. Some of the new 
institutions carried out a number of studies and investigations 
in the sub-region and prepared the first diagnoses and global 
investment programmes which established the bases for future 
planning activities. 
The first institutional bodies were of the nature of technical 
offices dependent on a ministry (generally of the economy) or 
reporting directly to the office of the president but without being 
accorded ministerial rank. Since then important institutional 
changes have been introduced up to the point where they now constitute 
agencies at ministerial level in most of the countries here considered. 
Exceptionally, in the cases of Guatemala and Honduras, the central 
organism consists of a technical secretariat depending administra-
tively on the Ministry for the Economy in the first instance and 
on the Presidency in the second, with the senior official holding 
ministerial status. 
In general, the economic planning system comprises: 
a) a senior collegiate organ of political decision of the nature 
of a Planning Council, in most instances composed of ministers and 
representatives of various social, political and economic sectors; 
b) a central technical organism which in most of the countries acts 
at ministerial level -with the already mentioned exception of 
Guatemala and Honduras- and includes global, sectoral and, in 
almost all cases, regional programming; c) sectoral planning units 
in other government agencies with a high degree of autonomy 
vis-"a-vis the central organism, and d) co-ordination and directive 
committees at sectoral and regional level in all the countries 
except El Salvador, and others of a consultative character in 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
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With regard to the duties legally allocated to the planning 
agencies, differences have been observed between the countries 
according to the nature of the corresponding central organisms and 
its place in the administrative establishment. There is, however, 
a common pattern of responsibilities that may in general be summed 
up as follows: a) to carry out studies, research and technical 
analyses on partial or global aspects of economic and social affairs, 
b) to formulate and propose optional economic and social policies 
for the short, medium and long term; c) to draw up economic and 
social development plans and strategies for submission to and consid-
eration by senior levels of decision; d) co-ordinate the implementation 
of plans, programmes and development projects? e) evaluate the 
execution of plans, policies, programmes and projects; f) co-ordinate 
and administer external technical co-operation; g) take part in 
the negotiation of and in some cases put forward opinions on external 
indebtedness; h) examine and propose administrative reforms; 
i) take part in some cases in the formulation of the public sector 
budget, and, in other instances, assume direct responsibilities 
for this task, and j) identify, assess and allocate priority and 
regional development projects. 
In addition to the aforementioned duties, Panama includes 
the administration, control and execution of the government budget 
and the definition and administration of financial policy, primarily 
in monetary and credit matters. For its part, in El Salvador, 
the Minister for Economic Planning also acts as President of the 
Monetary Committee. 
Numerous formal and institutional changes have been introduced 
in the system and in the planning offices of the sub-region since 
their institution up to the present time. It is judged that to 
attempt to list them would exceed the scope of this document, the 
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sole aim of which is to examine more meticulously the recently-
achieved advances, and especially the changes that have taken 
place in the planning process as a result of the present economic 
crisis. It has consequently been preferred to record in greater 
detail -in this part of the study which refers to institutional 
aspects- the amendments introduced during the period 1982-1984. 
b) Recent changes 
i) Costa Rica. In September 1982, by means of Law N° 68-12 
on the restructuring of the executive branch of government, the 
National Planning and Economic Policy Office was converted into a 
Ministry, as a consequence of which the central organ was raised 
in rank in an effort to strengthen the role of planning as a 
directive and co-ordinating instrument in the concerns of the 
public sector. 
In January 1983 a decree was enacted whereby a Sectoral 
Planning and Directive Sub-system was established, mainly for the 
purposes of reinforcing and expediting the efforts of the national 
planning system; encouraging greater community participation in 
the search for solutions to the country's economic and social 
problems; ensuring the co-ordination of institutions, programmes 
and public activities through the institution of a sectoral 
planning system, and introducing a novel juridical mechanism to 
fortify action by the central government in respect of the decen-
tralized entities. 
The Sectoral Planning and Directive Sub-system set up in 
pursuit of these objectives comprised the following organisms: 
a senior level of decision composed of: a) a Government Council 
as the senior centre in the implementation of decisions; b) the 
Economic and Social Council composed of the President of the 
Republic, the two Vice-Presidents and the Ministers of the 
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Presidency and of Planning; c) two committees -economic and social-
consisting of the ministers linked with the particular areas concerned; 
d) Sectoral National Councils presided over by the corresponding 
minister, and e) Consultative Sectoral Committees as centres of 
consultation and participation by private community organizations. 
At the technical level Executive Planning Secretariats were set 
up as subordinate to the corresponding sectoral minister and responsible, 
among other duties, for carrying out sectoral planning; and, lastly, 
technical co-ordination committees. 
In the regional sphere, various units were also established 
to adopt decisions, plan and consult. 
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the decree in 
question combined, on the one hand, the decentralization of functions 
of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy towards the sectoral 
and institutional planning units, and from the central to the 
regional level on the other. It furthermore aimed to attain a more 
participative planning process. 
ii) El Salvador. A Foreign Financing Secretariat was set up 
within the Planning Ministry with the duty of obtaining external 
financial resources and channeling them towards the executive 
institutions. 
The internal organization of the Planning Ministry was 
restructured, combining under one management the tasks of global 
and sectoral planning. A high-level organism headed by the Minister 
of Planning was also established to act in an advisory capacity to 
the Presidency of the Republic in order to stimulate the implemen-
tation of the National Reactivation Plan (PREN). 
iii) Guatemala. Prominent among recent institutional, changes 
introduced in this country are the following: 
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An Inter-Institutional System for Reconstruction and 
Development was established in October 1983 comprising: the Inter-
Institutional Co-ordinating Office (CIN), Departmental (Provincial) 
Inter-Institutional Co-ordinating Offices (CID), Municipal Co-ordi-
nation Units (CIM), and Local Development Committees (CDL). 
The corresponding official document declares that "the purpose 
of the inter-institutional co-ordinating offices is to guide and 
direct the efforts of the public sector in formulating and executing 
planned and programmed activities aiming to achieve national 
reconstruction and development".9/ 
The Inter-Institutional Co-ordinating Office at the national 
level is headed by the Chief of Staff of National Defence and 
includes the State Undersecretaries, the Economic Planning Secretariat, 
and senior officials of decentralized institutions. The Executive 
Director of the National Reconstruction Committee (an organism 
established as a result of the severe earthquake of February 1976) 
acts as the co-ordinator of the Committee. At other institutional 
co-ordination levels, the presidency of the Committee is also 
exercised by local military authorities with the participation of 
other officials including economic planning representatives. 
Other governmental co-ordination organisms established in 
consequence of the October 1983 decision have been as follows: 
the Economic, Social and Infrastructure Cabinets consisting of the 
ministers of State together with senior personnel of the decentralized 
institutions. The Economic Cabinet had been operating outside the 
formal institutional structure under the co-ordination of the 
Economic Planning Secretariat, but in accordance with the new 
legal provisions the technical secretariat was assigned firstly to 
the Central Bank and subsequently to the Finance Ministry. 
iv) Honduras. The Ministry for Presidential Affairs 
("Ministerio de la Presidencia") was established at the beginning 
9/ See: Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, Acuerdo Gubernativo 
N° 772-83, October 1983. 
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of 1982 with duties including, among others, the co-ordination of 
government economic activities. As a result of this measure the 
Technical Secretariat of the Senior Economic Planning Council became 
dependent on that Ministry rather than on the Presidency of the 
Republic. 
Various legal bills (projects of law) were also formulated 
in this period with the aim of strengthening the planning system 
but are still under consideration. Among these should be mentioned 
a new planning law which seeks to integrate more effectively the 
organisms engaged in the system and to establish a greater obligatory 
linkage between plans and budgets; a legal initiative tending to 
regulate the co-ordination of external economic co-operation; and 
another aiming to establish a national projects system. 
Finally, after several years of inactivity, the Senior Economic 
Planning Council was set up for the purpose of discussing and 
approving the 1982-1986 National Development Plan. 
v) Nicaragua. Since the change in political focus the Nica-
raguan Government and administrative apparatus have introduced some 
important restructuring measures in terms of dimension and concept. 
The traditional planning system comprising a small technical office 
dependent on the Economics Ministry consequently underwent trans-
formations in order to adapt it to the new duties undertaken by the 
State. According to an official statement in this respect "not only 
has the internal division of duties (of the State) been rationalized 
but a new directive concept of economic policy has also been instituted, 
based on the National Planning System and specifically on the Ministry 
of Planning."10/ As a recently organized system, it has undergone 
few changes during the period under review. 
10/ See: Ministerio de Planificación, Programa de reactivación 
económica en beneficio del Pueblo 80. Managua, January 1980. 
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Prominent developments in the past three years have been: 
advances in the consolidation of the system in general and 
especially of the Programme Co-ordination Committees ("Comisiones 
Programáticas de Coordinación") which act as operational links 
between the Ministry of Planning, the senior level of political 
decision and executive institutions responsible for formulating 
policy proposals in 12 specific areas and submitting them to the 
senior level. Another prominent development has been the consoli-
dation of national councils dealing with agricultural, industrial 
and commercial matters and operating as consultative organs at 
the service of the private, entrepreneurial and popular sectors. 
In the sectoral sphere progress has been made in strengthening 
the planning unit of the Ministry of Agricultural Development and 
Agrarian Reform. 
vi) Panama. During the period under review (1982-1984) 
several significant changes have been introduced in the Panamanian 
planning system with a view to consolidating the experience 
achieved over the past ten years. 
The National Investment Council was set up in August 1982 
as part of the Ministry for the Presidency in order to promote 
national and foreign investments in the country. !!_/ Subsequently, 
by means of Resolution N° 67 dated February 1984, the Pre-
investments Fund was attached to the Ministry of Economic Planning 
as an organ of the Senior Directorate of this Ministry.12/ 
By means of Decree N° 58 (December 1982) the Directorate of 
Public Credit was formed, its main duties being to formulate 
11/ See, Gaceta Oficial N° 1984 dated 6 July 1983. 
12/ See, Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica, 
Memoria 1984. 
- 31 -
public credit plans (internal and external), participate in financing 
negotiations, and examine and recommend investment projects. 
For the purpose of formulating, proposing and co-ordinating 
projects for the better employment of assets, installations and 
resources in the area being returned in the Canal Zone the Planning 
and Development Office of the Canal area was formed in place of 
the former National Canal Commission which had been operating 
independently from the programmes of the central planning organism. 
This move introduced a significant strengthening of the 
planning system since its functions now include the use and 
development of the important resources reverting to Panamanian 
control. 
Finally, a Co-ordinating Committee has been established, 
comprising the Ministries of the Presidency, Finance, Planning, 
the Office of the General Comptroller and the National Bank of 
Panama, with the aim of organizing and improving administrative 
affairs. 
2. Characteristics of the planning systems prior 
to the economic crisis 
The main initial examples of planning in the countries of the Isthmus 
were the first public investment plans, particularly those empha-
sizing infrastructural economic and social projects which incorporated 
only some aspects of economic, fiscal and administrative policy. 
The second stage began shortly after the Meeting of Central 
American Presidents held in San José, Costa Rica in March 1963 at 
which activities to be undertaken were discussed in order to make 
use of opportunities under the "Alliance for Progress" programme. 
One of the resolutions adopted in the Presidential Declaration was 
to "formulate national economic and social development plans, co-
ordinating them at the Central American level, and progressively 
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carry out regional programming for the various sectors of the 
economy".13/ Although the regional spirit of the process did 
not find materialization in subsequent studies, the declaration 
represented strong support for the planning organisms of the 
sub-region, and national plans were in practice formulated applying 
similar methodological concepts and contents for a more or less 
homogeneous period (1965-1969). 
Those plans attempted in general to establish the bases for 
more sustained growth than in the past. In most cases they repre-
sented a search for inward growth by expanding the internal Central 
American markets together with the diversification of extra-regional 
exports. Public investment programming was emphasized, with the 
addition of some guidelines of an indicative nature for private 
agents. 
In the recent decade planning exercises have gradually 
incorporated new areas of attention, including a larger number 
of productive sectors and introducing the spatial dimension 
-regional and urbanization development- and other specific interests 
such as science and technology, the environment, employment, social 
welfare and food. This acquired the nature of an "all-embracing" 
approach -global and sectoral- in terms of endeavouring to embrace 
most economic and social areas at a time when the operation of 
economic planning was confined to certain aspects only. Moreover, 
the institutional set-up was encountering difficulties in influ-
encing the fulfiment of objectives. 
Formal expressions in the exercise of economic planning in 
the sub-region took the form in the first place of documents 
13/ See: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 
La planificación económica y social en Centroaimérica, Alberto 
Rull Sabater, Madrid, 1969, p. 260. 
- 33 -
outlining strategies for long-term development involving broad 
economic and social objetives and general guidelines for their 
attainment. 
In the second place medium-term plans were produced, generally 
covering a five-year period, containing objectives, goals, political 
measures and investment programmes at global and sectoral levels 
and including, more recently, a regional dimension. Finally, 
although not in a generalized manner, those medium-term aims were 
reflected in annual operating plans which reviewed the evolution 
of the economy and introduced amendments as justified by the changing 
situation. 
In short, although such plans were in most cases implemented 
only partially, and despite their rigid and formal character, the 
planning process over the past two decades has been of significant 
assistance and contributed to some of the economic, social and 
institutional transformations that have taken place in the Isthmus. 
Interpretative studies -diagnoses- of economic circumstances 
have in the first place been carried out which have provided a 
better view of the productive structures of the countries and their 
place in the international economy. 
Secondly, the planning system has fulfilled an important role 
in the gradual change observed in the position of the various 
governments which have moved from traditional passive attitudes 
to a promotional and directive role in economic and social devel-
opment . 
In the third place, greater order and consistency have been 
attained in the programming and execution of public expenditure by 
applying budgeting-by-programme techniques and formulating operating 
plans. Contributions have also been made in the management, 
identification, formulation, evaluation and procurement of financing 
for investment projects. 
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Fourthly, among other aspects, the planning offices have 
promoted and collaborated in the institutional modernization of 
the governments. State-operated enterprises and decentralized 
entities supporting productive activities have been diversified 
and strengthened; the civil service (regulation of the adminis-
trative career system) has been established, and a process of 
inter-institutional co-ordination has been introduced. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, some of the systems 
have fulfilled a role of co-ordination and consultation within the 
public sector and between it and other economic agents. Conflicting 
interests have thus been harmonized and agreement reached in 
connection with national development projects and concerning the 
best manner in which to carry them out. In the process of this 
work, these systems have assumed the duties of technical advisory 
bodies to other public dependencies. 
To sum up: allowing for important differences between the 
countries in question, the exercise of planning in Central America 
-at least up to the end of the 1970s- has on the whole been conducted 
formally (as for instance in the drawing up of medium-term plans), 
comprehensively, supposedly compulsory for the public sector, 
indicative for private interests, and in a comparatively non-
participative manner. Despite these characteristics -of "technocratic 
enclaves" not always articulated with the process of political 
decision- some of the systems have succeeded in introducing more 
operative methods in their planning procedures, prominent among 
the latter being the provision of advisory services and the constant 
harmonization of varying interests. In other instances, the 
planning organisms have undertaken specific duties, such as the 
drawing up of the budget in Panama and the co-ordination of external 
technical co-operation in almost all the countries concerned. 
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IV. SOME EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS IN THE PLANNING SYSTEMS 
1. General considerations 
Among many other consequences, the crisis faced by the countries 
of the Central American Isthmus has drawn the attention of the 
national economic authorities towards the short term, has under-
lined the significance of financial variables and aggravated 
disagreements concerning income distribution and conflicts between 
different sectors within and outside the public sector. Most 
of the planning systems seem not to have adapted their efforts 
to this abrupt change of circumstances and those that have 
continued their customary tasks following bygone patterns have 
foiind themselves rapidly overtaken by developments. For example, 
as recently as the first years of the present decade some attempts 
to draw up formal medium-term plans were made but proved virtually 
obsolete before reaching the printers. 
Even the organizations which followed a more pragmatic 
style in their work found themselves faced by dilemmas and fresh 
conflicts. In the planning of public investment there have been 
less resources to programme and ever greater difficulties in 
drawing up budgets in view of uncertainties regarding the evolution 
of income. In so far as reconciling interests in connection with 
projects is concerned these organisms have found themselves faced 
by a greater number of conflicting viewpoints. These circumstances 
have confirmed once again that it is decidedly easier to programme 
in times of abundance than in conditions of austerity. Moreover, 
projects as such have frequently come to nought, leaving in their 
place only the concept of survival and avoidance of even greater 
deterioration. 
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The crisis has also contributed to the demise of development 
patterns, these being replaced by few, if any, options other than 
the neo-classical model which, with some variants, has found 
defenders in the national milieu and also abroad among official 
multilateral and bilateral finance agencies. The atmosphere of 
confusion and uncertainty which has followed, and still continues, 
in numerous countries has contributed to an apparent loss of 
credibility on the part of many planning systems. The following 
notes explore in greater detail the manner in which the economic 
crisis has affected those systems. 
2. Plans in force in the period 1982-1984 
In the sphere of formal activities, the countries were drawing up 
prior to this period more or less regular medium-term plans 
covering periods of from four to five years as part of a long-term 
strategy -generally for implementation during the 1970s- and 
supplemented (although not in all the sub-regional countries) by 
operating plans. This continuity was interrupted as from 1980. 
In the first place, documents formulating a development strategy 
for the present decade were not drawn up and, secondly, plans 
covered shorter periods and some even referred to years corresponding 
to other, medium-term, periods thus giving rise to temporary over-
laps between one and another plan. 
As already suggested, the preparation of formal plans is 
not the only activity -and in some cases not even the main concern-
of planning systems. However, an analysis of what has been done 
in this connection in recent years enables two contrary trends 
to be observed; on the one hand that of continuing some type of 
formal testing exercise and on the other that of introducing 
changes of approach and scope in that exercise. This -among other 
reasons- has undoubtedly been due to the need deriving from the 
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economic crisis to adapt global, sectoral and regional plans to 
the emerging cyclical situation. In this respect four more or 
less clear modalities may be observed in the activities of the 
planning organisms of the Isthmus corresponding to the character-
istics, severity and duration of the crisis, the institutional 
position of the organisms concerned, and their capacity to 
intervene in the definition of short-term economic policy. 
In three of the countries -Guatemala, Honduras and Costa 
Rica- planning efforts (with some differences of style) have 
concentrated on adding to known development objetives (balanced, 
sustained and equitable growth) those aiming to correcting the 
more notorious financial imbalances (balance of payments, public 
finances and inflation), but without assigning priorities to the 
objectives nor referring to the possible contradictions liable to 
arise between them. 
In the case of El Salvador, long-term goals -linked with 
the real area of the economy and consistent with the key objectives 
of economic and social development- and other aspects, have centred 
exclusively on overcoming cyclical problems, even without taking 
into account the most significant event taking place in the 
country, namely the prevailing social and political confrontation. 
An event occurring in Panama has been the practical disap-
pearance of expressions of formal planning due to a concentration 
in the central organism -whose responsibilities include the 
definition and co-ordination of fiscal, monetary and credit policies-
of the tasks of developing and co-ordinating short-term economic 
policy with emphasis on the financial area; although a parallel 
important undertaking has been that of studying regional develop-
ment and proposing measures in this sphere. 
Finally, in Nicaragua, planning concerns have centred on 
the economic problem and consequent counter-measures, attention 
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to real objectives associated with the construction of an egali-
tarian and more participative society, and to policies related 
to recovery in the productive establishment. Since the end of 
1983, however, greater consideration has been given to financial 
difficulties. 
a) Costa Rica. The national development plan known as the 
Return to the Soil Plan ("Volvamos a la Tierra"), 1982-1986, 
establishes as a general objective "a review of the country's 
development strategy involving not only a change in models of 
production and consumption but taking into account the political, 
ethical and moral structures of society. A thorough revision of 
the productive system is intended. Of particular importance is 
a revision of the industrial ... and the allocation of a central 
role to the agricultura sector . ..".1_4/ Specific objectives in 
the political area include the strengthening of democracy and 
unrestricted adherence to cultural and ethical values. In the 
economic and social sphere they include the improvement of income 
distribution and wealth, economic growth, greater efficiency in 
the productive sectors, the strengthening of social and cultural 
processes to perfect democratic practices, reduction of regional 
differences, and increasing participation in development mangement 
and improvement in export capacity. 
In its main aims the strategy endeavours to convert the 
agricultural sector into the king-pin of development, integrating 
it more closely with manufacturing industry in order to "transform 
the resources stemming from the primary national sector rather 
than obtain them from abroad"15/ by increasing productivity ana 
14/ See: Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política 
Económica, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Volvamos a la Tierra, 1982-




stimulating technological development adapted to prevailing 
conditions and the supply of national resources; important 
changes in historical patterns in connection with public invest-
ment resources; more co-ordination between the institutions of 
the agricultural sector and its component parts and with those 
responsible for export promotion. 
The industries processing farm products and national raw 
materials and those engaged in the selective production of import 
substitutes are to merit the special support of the State, as well 
as those generating high levels of employment or turning out 
agricultural inputs. Industrial protection policies by means of 
taxation and customs dues will seek to ensure a degree of compet-
itiveness to serve as a stimulus to increasing productivity. 
The State, in its capacity as one of the principal agents 
of national development, will be guided by criteria of administra-
tive efficiency and efficacy with a view to attaining planned 
objectives. For this purpose it is intended to evaluate the 
dimensions of the government and of the areas in which it should 
intervene. Its role in the redistribution of wealth and promotion 
of social justice is to be reinforced by "stimulating private 
initiative and incorporating the citizenry in productive activities 
as a basic resource in achieving a better distribution of wealth";16/ 
attempts are also envisaged to balance public finances through 
direct and progressive taxation together with austerity in terms 
of expenditure; and public investment is to be directed towards 
the elimination of important restrictions in agricultural activity 
and the improvement of transportation. 
In social terms the plan aims to re-examine educational and 
health systems in order to adapt them to current circumstances and 
16/ Ministerio de Planificación . . . , op. cit. 
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to the new model of programmed development, while consolidating 
the attainments so far achieved in the fields of labour and social 
security. 
Finally, to the foregoing aims -which are common to most 
plans- were added (with less analysis and without examining their 
degree of coherence) general outlines of economic and social policy 
in terms of economic stabilization, austerity in expenses and the 
rationalization of public administration, together with objectives 
relative to economic revival. 
b) El Salvador. Various changes of government and consequently 
of political orientation have taken place in El Salvador since 1979. 
This fact has been reflected in the planning process, giving rise 
to the formulation of various plans of differing temporary scope 
and to some overlapping in the different periods envisaged. Thus, 
for example, the National "Welfare for All" Plan was formulated in 
1977 for the period 1978-1982, and the National Emergency Plan was 
drawn up in 1979 re-formulating basic orientations in accordance 
with the economic and social objectives of the Proclamation of the 
Armed Forces, thereby introducing substantial modifications in the 
conceptual aims of the government and instituting various reforms 
including the nationalization of banks and foreign trade and the 
early stages of an agrarian reform process. 
The Three-Year Plan -1981-1983- envisaged a new model of 
society and, in economic terms, proposed among other aspects the 
democratization of ownership of the means of production -mainly 
farming property- the conformation of a modern and technified 
agricultural industry, training of human resources, a greater use 
of fishery resources, and consideration of industry as the driving 
force in national progress. 
The model set out to stimulate the joint participation of 
workers, producers, artisans and professional practitioners with 
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the aim of attaining higher levels of production, consumption and 
savings. The establishment of self-supporting associative organi-
zations was also to be promoted, thereby converting the worker into 
an owner of means of production. It further declared that private 
enterprise would continue as an important agent in the process of 
development, but co-ordinating its interests with those of the 
community. In so far as the State is concerned, "it will act during 
the period as a stimulating element in development through the 
medium of important investments and the promotion and direction of 
the country's productive forces".17/ 
The plan additionally envisaged the active participation of 
the population at various levels and the attainment of a national 
concensus in relation to the plan as a prerequisite for attainment 
of the chosen objectives. 
The following are among the main economic and social policies 
considered: 
i) To promote an increase of productivity and in the supply 
of traditional export products, and a greater degree of diversifi-
cation in agricultural and manufacturing industry in order to reduce 
external dependency. 
ii) To utilize the indebtedness capacity of the country by 
procuring credit to supplement internal resources; carry out a 
selective import policy; promote external sales of traditional and 
non-traditional goods -especially agro-industrial products; and 
acknowledge the advisability of foreign investment as supplementary 
to that generated locally, mainly in the transfer of technology. 
iii) The State was assigned a large share in investment and 
in the solution of social imbalances; it would contribute to income 
re-distribution and support productive activities by means of basic 
17/ See, Ministerio de Planificación y Coordinación del 
DesarroXlo Económico y Social, Plan Trienal 1980-1983, El Salvador. 
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infrastructural works. It would also strengthen fiscal income 
and make minimum use of deficit financing. 
iv) In the social sphere the plan favours increasing 
community participation and development; the search for consensus 
in labour-employer relationships; the achievement of higher levels 
of employment; promotion of production of foodstuffs; the influencing 
of demographic trends and the geographical distribution of the 
population. 
Despite the existence of this three-year plan the aggravation 
of the crisis has been evidenced by limitations in the external 
sector, public finances and the financial system, together with a 
contraction of public and private investment, leading to the 
formulation in 198 3 of the National Economic Recovery Programme 
("Programa de Reactivación Económica Nacional, 1983") which redirected 
economic policy and the objectives of the aforementioned plans, and 
proposed a combination of specific measures to overcome the crisis. 
Prominent among these objectives were: to curb the drop in 
production and employment and reduce external strangulation and 
the fiscal deficit. At the same time, strategic guidelines concen-
trated on an adequate and pragmatic management of the reforms 
already instituted -in banking and in foreign and agrarian trade; 
State support to the private sector as an indispensable factor in 
the productive process; economic recovery based on the farming, 
industrial and building sectors, better use of installed capacity; 
the procurement of adequate external financing, encouragement of 
capital repatriation, and the setting in order of the monetary 
and credit system. 
c) Guatemala. Three different situations were observable 
in the period 1982-1984. Two plans remained in force in 1983 
-the 1980-1982 plan- which up-dated the preceding equivalent programme 
for the period 1979-1982, and aji annual programme known as the 
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Short-Term Economic Policy Plan. In 1983, on the other hand, no 
type of plan was in hand, either for the medium or short term; and, 
finally, in 1984 the application began of a two-year document 
(1984-1985), of which the most important objectives and the strategy 
envisaged 1_8/ are summarized hereunder. 
The fundamental objective is to achieve the greatest degree 
of satisfaction in the basic needs of the population -in other words 
to promote social participation. "This objective demands as a pre-
requisite a framework of security, democratic and participative, 
based on legal principles guaranteeing individual and collective 
freedom."19/ 
Among its general objectives are: to set in motion the 
recovery of economic activity; progressively improve income distrib-
ution; fortify external relations; reduce unemployment and under-
employment; consolidate the process of national regularization, and 
achieve a greater degree of national integration. 
The strategy contained in the plan expresses in the first 
place that production development should primarily rely on private 
enterprise. In this context it is suggested that the latter should 
be "the main protagonist in the process of change"; secondly, it 
establishes a substantial modification of the concepts ruling hitherto 
by proposing that economic growth should be based on a better 
employment of national resources and the internal market, but 
without overlooking the promotion of traditional and non-traditional 
exports. Thirdly, the public sector is assigned an active role 
in the promotion of economic and social development by rational-
izing public expenditure and supporting private production. In the 
fourth place foreign investment should be regulated in order that 
18/ See, Jefatura de Estado, Consejo Nacional de Planificación 




it act only as a supplement to national capital. In the last-
mentioned sense the State should guide the process of technological 
transfer inherent in foreign investment. 
With regard to the instruments and measures; of economic policy, 
the plan emphasizes; 
i) Intensification of the promotion of traditional and non-
traditional exports; the strengthening of trade with other countries 
of the sub-region and of the capacity to negotiate with external 
interests, and the rationalization of imports and more profitable 
use of national inputs; 
ii) the need to improve the efficiency and efficacy of action 
by the public sector through decentralization and déconcentration; 
seek regional equilibrium through the appropriate allocation of 
investment projects; increase the participation of the public sector 
in the distribution of surplus earnings by means of a progressive 
tax structure while applying a criterion of equity; redirect the 
fiscal deficit through greater efficiency in the tax and tariff 
system, making use of expenditure as an instrument of income 
redistribution, and 
iii) the need to increase rural employment by supporting 
medium and small agricultural enterprises and the promotion of 
infrastructural construction making intensive use of manual labour; 
guarantee the application of minimum wages and see to the improve-
ment of working conditions in general; regulate migratory flows 
in farm work and expand social security programmes. 
Although the plan contains a broad range of policies and 
activities of a social nature and in connection with prices, science 
and technology, production and community participation in develop-
ment, the measures here outlined are those of greatest relevance 
in this instance and enable the orientations of economic policy 
to be understood. 
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d) Honduras. The 1982-1986 National Development Plan has 
been in force during the period under review. This plan estab-
lishes the following medium-term objectives:2_0/ to achieve a 
higher standard of living by satisfying the basic needs of the 
population; lower the levels of unemployment and under-employment; 
improve the level and distribution of income; diversify national 
production; make more rational use of natural resources; increase 
and diversify export capacity; achieve economic and financial 
stability (abatement of the external and public deficits), and 
promote balanced local development with prospects of national 
integration and linkage with the rest of the Central American 
region. To the development objectives traditionally considered, 
this plan adds that of achieving economic and financial stability, 
though without including an order of priorities for this endeavour. 
For its part the strategy adopted allocates to the State the 
role of negotiator and promoter of development, and in some instances 
its direct participation in activities related to the conserva-
tion and use of national resources, the supply of basic public 
services, the construction of an economic infra-structure and of 
export facilities. Direct government investment is envisaged as 
being made in strategic areas for which the private areas possesses 
neither the necessary resources nor investment capacity. 
An important role is alloted to the private sector in the 
search for new investment opportunities and it is considered 
that the invigoration of their activities would ensure favourable 
conditions of political and social stability. 
With regard to the productive structure, priority is allocated 
to the production of goods for export and of foodstuffs for 
internal consumption with a view to achieving self-sufficiency 
in this latter respect. The national financial system would 
provide support for these purposes, and the execution of projects 
20/ See, Secretaria Técnica del Consejo Superior de Plani-
ficación Económica, Estrategia para el desarrollo de Honduras, 
July 1982, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. 
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in support of production or of a directly productive character 
would be stepped up. Efforts would be made to optimize the use 
of installed capacity, especially in the farming and agro-industrial 
spheres. 
With a view to increasing the supply of traditional and new 
export products and to diversifying foreign sales the government 
would make lines of credit available to the private sector, on an 
ad-hoc basis, support the promotion and marketing of products and 
make use of advantages stemming from preferential trade treaties. 
In the matter of economic integration it is intended to 
promote measures to stimulate Central American trade and develop-
ment. 
In so far as the provision of social services is concerned 
the strategy envisages the association of these services with the 
agrarian reform programme and with support to the productive 
sectors together with the expansion of present coverage and quality 
improvements in this respect, the strengthening of different forms 
of social community organization and greater participation of 
women in the development process. 
The plan attributes particular significance to local develop-
ment (at the municipal level) as a spatial unit suited to the 
implementation of strategies, policies, programmes and investment 
projects. 
Taxation policy would seek not only to increase fiscal 
income but also to influence the allocation of resources in a 
manner consistent with the envisaged objectives. 
The public sector deficit would be held down to level 
compatible with non-inflationary internal financing availabilities, 
making careful use of external credit and raising the level of 
public sector savings. 
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e) Nicaragua. Although no medium-term public plans or 
development strategies have been drawn up in the past three years, 
the planning process in this country, as already mentioned, has 
acquired vigour based on the conceptual orientation of the new 
government specified in the programme of the National Reconstruction 
Government Junta. Through the medium of annual operating plans 
and other economic policy documents,2^/ main objectives, policy 
guidelines, reactivation, austerity and efficiency programmes have 
been defined. 
Among main medium-term objectives are those of: modifying 
the mode of participation of the country in the international 
economy; attaining autonomy in the production and supply of basic 
consumer goods, and constructing a just and egalitarian society in 
the distribution of economic opportunities and compensations. Over 
a shorter period it is sought to: consolidate the process of 
internal transformations and strengthen the mixed economy; raise 
permanent employment levels and maintain the real purchasing value 
of wages; and, finally, attenuate the problems deriving from the 
scarcity of foreign currency, inflationary pressures and the public 
sector deficit. 
The related strategy 22/ establishes the conformation of a 
mixed economy composed of a State area owned by the people ("Area 
de Propiedad del Pueblo"), a private area, and a mixed are supported 
by joint public and private investments. Thus, "... the State will 
support and protect the operations of national enterprises, 
especially small and medium ventures, vis-a-vis those of transna-
tional interests."23/ 
21/ See, for example, documents prepared by.the Planning 
Ministry: Programa de Reactivación en Beneficio del Pueblo 80, and 
Programa Economico de Austeridad y Eficiencia 81. Also that issued 
by the Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional de Nicaragua, Lineamientos 
de Política Económica 1983-1988, Managua, September 1983. 
22/ See, Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional de 
Nicaragua, Programa, Managua, July 1979. 
23/ Ibid. 
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In addition, the State reserves for itself the control of 
utilization and administration of certain natural resources (mines, 
forests, fishing, energy . ..), as well as of the banking system and 
foreign trade. Foreign investment is regarded as fulfilling a 
"strictly supplementary" role to internal activity and would therefore 
be regulated in order to protect national interests. 
The agrarian reform process -a fundamental element in the 
overall strategy- seeks to introduce a transformation to ensure 
access to farming land, credit, technical assistance and other 
means of production on the part of the rural population. Associations 
are especially promoted to work the land, the exploitation of small 
landholdings being avoided with a view to attaining appropriate 
productivity levels. Land leases and the use of irrigation are 
also subject to official regulation. 
Encouragement, in a manner consistent with agrarian reform, 
is accorded to internal regional development with the aim of 
satisfying the specific needs of each district, special attention 
being given to the Atlantic coastal area. 
In so far as production is concerned the first priority is 
assigned to agricultural output for internal consumption together 
with agro-industrial development, the use of labour-intensive working 
methods and the search for greater efficiency. 
In the social sphere it is sought to furnish real possibilities 
for the improvement of living standards through policies aiming 
to eliminate unemployment, ensure entitlements to housing, health, 
social security, collective transportation, education and other 
goods and services. Finally, it is intended to carry out a 
thorough reform of public administration, with a view to rational-
izing its functions, improving efficiency and instituting a planning 
system making feasible and ensuring the execution of the government's 
economic and social investment programme. 
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Among short-term aims, the following deserve mention: the 
regularization of public finances by encouraging savings and 
raising tax levels; the improvement of productivity in the public 
sector; a policy of greater selectivity in investments; the fight 
against inflation through appropriate management not only of public 
expenditure but also of price and wage policies, and the promotion 
of productive supplies. 
With regard to the external sector, significant efforts are 
pledged with the aim of increasing and diversifying exports, 
rationalizing imports and mobilizing net external financing. It 
is intended that monetary and credit policies be less expansive and 
strongly directed to the financing of priority activities in national 
economic policy. 
f) Panama. Although apparently less intensively than in the 
other countries of the Isthmus, the economic crisis has also 
adversely affected the Panamanian economy. This circumstance, 
coupled with changes of direction in government policy, has also 
been reflected in planning, albeit in a manner somewhat different 
from that in other sub-regional countries, due to the particular 
nature of the national economy and of the planning system itself. 
It should be borne in mind, as already mentioned, that within the 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy -which occupies a high 
position in the administrative organization of the State- budgeting 
work is carried out together with that concerning the financial 
area as such. Consequently, in the particular case of Panama, the 
more significant changes emanate from the ministry in question 
which also deals with accentuated tasks in the real and financial 
areas of the economy. 
In regard to the formal expression of planning and strategies, 
these have been interrupted since 1980 and no official national, 
regional or sectoral plans or national development strategies have 
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been issued since that time. A series of studies conducted under 
the general title of Programme of Economic Studies for Panamanian 
Economic Revival are nevertheless being carried out and a document 
entitled Opciones estratégicas para el desarrollo regional, 1980-
1990 has been prepared. Its aim is to establish the need to 
consider the financial restrictions to which the country is likely 
to be exposed during the rest of the present decade, for which 
purpose it would be necessary to seek a more balanced pattern of 
development in the various national regions. The document also 
postulates the advisability of channeling and guiding the spatial 
impact of the Torrijos-Carter treaty in the metropolitan area 
(Panama-Colon) and the relationship of the latter with the rest 
of the country. In this connection the need is emphasized to 
integrate the infrastructure and land and water resources of the 
Canal area returned to the territory and economy of the country 
as a whole. 
Finally, no other official document is available containing 
a definition of short-term macro-economic or social policy. The 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy nevertheless sponsored a 
meeting in 1983 with representatives of private enterprise to 
examine the social and economic situation. As a result of that 
event some optional strategies were identified, at least for the 
1983-1984 period. In short, it may be said that, in the case of 
Panama no medium or long-term, nor global or sectoral national 
t 
plans have been produced in the past five years. Planning has 
however fulfilled a prominent role in the co-ordination and 
rationalization of economic policy in its definition as such, and 
especially in the financial sphere, these tasks having clearly 
dominated the wide spectrum of duties allocated to this government 
agency. 
Finally, therefore, considering the combination of economic 
measures introduced in the course of the past five years, it may 
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be concluded, as in the rest of the Region, that planning has had 
a hand in dealing with a variety of challenges in Panama deriving 
from the financial limitations caused by the current crisis. 
The field of action for planning has been diverted to deal 
with cyclical difficulties while those of the real economic area 
are still under discussion prior to instituting a new development 
strategy. The main activities of the central organism have thus 
concentrated on putting forward proposals to overcome financial 
imbalances, basically in this instance in the balance of payments 
and public finances. Some activities -mainly in the sphere of 
government expenditure- tending to moderate the effects of the 
crisis and protect the degree of welfare formerly attained have 
been implemented, especially in the provincial area. 
3. Comments on the effects of the crisis on the 
planning systems 
a) Financial imbalances, especially in the fields of public 
finances and the external sector 
To the extent that fiscal and balance of payments imbalances 
have become more acute and inflationary pressures have grown, 
economic policy has gradually focussed on the attention of short-
term problems associated with the financial area. Planning systems 
that have taken an active interest in these topics have obviously 
been those that have managed to maintain or even improve their 
standing. Others, on the other hand, which have rdbained relatively 
unconcerned with the study of economic policy under conditions of 
crisis have allowed their status to weaken and give way to other 
organisms traditionally integrated in financial policy. 
Seen from another viewpoint, economic adjustment policies 
deriving from agreements reached with the International Monetary 
Fund in efforts to meet the crisis have sometimes been accompanied 
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by conceptual trends favouring the transfer to private interests 
of the role of protagonist in the field of development, implicitly 
bringing about an erosion in spheres traditionally entrusted to 
planning organisms, such as the programming of public investment. 
State action has thus concentrated primarily on the settlement of 
financial difficulties -frequently without the participation of the 
planning agencies- with consequent deferment of attention to 
development and transformation objectives. 
Together with other effects which will be referred to here-
under changing circumstances have hitherto been a prevalent feature 
of the immediate past and have been posing dilemmas as to how the 
planning systems might rationalize the situation through the appli-
cation of concepts of wider scope. Faced with situations of this 
nature three types of response have been observable -with differences 
of degree- on the part of planning organisms: 
i) Some planning offices have continued to concentrate their 
efforts on the medium term as traditionally linked with the real 
area of the economy and have become less involved in the formulation 
of short-term economic policy. Attention has howerver been given 
in formal plans to the objective of financial stabilization, but 
without allocating priorities to the various goals or considering 
possible contradictions arising between the latter; 
ii) Other organisms have increasingly intervened in the 
definition of stabilization and adjustment policies, with varying 
degrees of success (as in El Salvador and Panama) „, With the 
result, however, that gradually less attention has; been devoted to 
problems in the real area of the economy. 
iii) Finally, in Nicaragua, planning offices have partici-
pated in the definition of short-term economic policy, influencing 
it in such a way that preference has been given to action consistent 
with longer-term guidelines in the real area of the economy. In 
this instance stability objectives have perhaps been excessively 
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subordinated to those in the real area of the economy with the 
result that the former have tended to deteriorate and have recently 
called for greater attention on the part of the authorities. 
b) Regularization of public expenditure and especially that of 
capital investment 
The subject of government expenditure, and in particular that 
part of it devoted to public investment has traditionally been one 
of the main instruments of programming in the concerns of government 
and at the same time the most important task undertaken by planning 
systems. It involves not only arranging hierarchically and identi-
fying the amount of public expenditure to carry out particular 
objectives but the co-ordination of agreements between the public 
sector representatives concerned in connection with that hierarchical 
order, and the promotion of timely identification, preparation and 
execution of projects and programmes forming part of the consolidated 
investment plan. 
As a result of the serious financial limitations that have 
been affecting the governments in recent years, and in view of 
inability in most cases to make use of effective tax reforms, trends 
have increasingly moved in the direction of more rigourous austerity 
policies in the disposal of public funds. This has brought about 
the need to accept sacrifices in the execution of programmes and 
projects included in development plans in the medium and long term 
and even, in some cases, of current operating plans. These projects 
have gradually been substituted in the scale of priorities by 
attention to operating costs -including (prominently in some 
countries) expenditure on security and defence and external and 
internal debt servicing. In these circumstances expenditure in real 
terms on infrastructural, development and social-service projects 
has had to be drastically curtailed. 
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As a result of such considerable contractions, important 
inconsistencies have arisen between programmed items included in 
final development plans and expenditure earmarked in annual budgets. 
The relative importance of public investment programming has in 
any case tended to lose weight. 
A parallel circumstance is that financial programming capac-
ity has in some cases become weaker in view of the uncertain pano-
rama, thus making it difficult to make more or less reliable forecasts 
of tax proceeds and consequently of preparing expenditure budgets 
with some degree of certainty. The need for continuous budget 
revisions has been weakening the system of programme budgeting 
which, although not carried out directly by the official planning 
agencies in five of the six sub-regional countries have at least 
enabled close links to be maintained between plans and annual 
expenditure. In this manner public expenditure has in some countries 
tended to be dealt with separately from the official planning field. 
There have been many examples of partially executed programmes due 
to defective budget allocations, even in the case of already 
completed projects. All the foregoing aspects have reduced the 
influence of the planning organisms in the allocation of public 
funds. Costa Rica represents a significant exception in this respect, 
the planning organism having in this case proposed and managed to 
establish a more precise mechanism of control in the allocation, 
rationalization and use of expenditure by means of the National 
Integrated Budgetary Planning and Accounting System ("Sistema 
Integrado de Planificación Presupuestaria y Contabilidad Nacional") 
which has sought to achieve closer integration between the budget 
and fiscal accountancy departments. 
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c) More rigorous control of external debt policy 
One of the effects of the crisis has been that of having to 
consider the policy of foreign indebtedness within the framework 
of global economic policy. This factor has posed a fresh challenge 
to planning since the greater the rigour required in the definition 
of debt policy, the greater shall be the participation of the 
planning organism as a "rationalizing element" at macro-economic 
level. 
The participation of most of the planning offices in the 
sub-region in debt-rephasing negotiations and in the control and 
administration of the foreign debt has in practice been weak, with 
the exception of Panama and, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua. Countries 
that have undertaken intense debt renegotiation processes have in 
many instances failed to achieve improvements in terms of settlement 
over the medium and long term. This has especially been the case 
in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, since periods of grace and other 
contracted terms have ultimately proved less favourable in the light 
of the evolution of their economies and they have had to face more 
rigorous situations than formerly. 
The lack of international liquidity has also been the cause of 
other prominent foreign parties progressively and increasingly 
influencing the definitions of internal economic policy, or at least 
persuading them in accordance with the weight of circumstances. 
This has been the case of some official financing sources and the 
international banking system. The new types of foreign relation-
ship to which this has given rise have thus to some extent weakened 
state control and consequently the planning agencies -over the 
destination of external financing. 
d) The panorama of uncertainty 
In the case of economies so exposed to international market 
conditions as those of the Central American Isthmus, part of the 
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exercise of planning -namely that involving the calculation of 
future assumptions and forecasts- has always been subject to 
considerable uncertainty with regard to future variations in the 
movement of a number of variables. 
The present crisis has provoked substantial changes in 
traditionally-applied concepts and paramétrés in a much more 
complex panorama than in the past. Traditional external dependency 
has become even more distorted by an accumulation of other factors, 
prominent among which have been the acute problem of external credit 
and uncertainties regarding the future international economic 
situation. To these difficulties have been added the unforeseeable 
outcome of the political and social tensions prevailing in the 
sub-region. This combination of factors has accentuated the 
panorama of uncertainty in the short and medium term. 
Those organisms which have continued to base their procedures 
on forecasts leading to quantitative goals have hence found themselves 
increasingly out of step with realities. On the other hand those 
planning systems which have tested new approaches, specifically 
tailored to programming in times of crisis and uncertainty (i.e., 
so-called "situational" or "strategic" planning) have apparently 
managed to preserve, and in some instances strengthen, their presence 
in the various economic cabinets. 
e) Capacity of the planning systems to adapt to new circumstances 
Throughout the present notes, the magnitude: of the changes 
which the countries of the Central American Isthmus have had to 
face has been stressed, in particular0 that of those changes origi-
nating outside their own fields of influence. In facing unaccustomed 
situations the governments and different social groups have often 
reacted slowly, considerably delaying their capacity to adapt. 
This situation has also been observed in the planning systems of 
most of the countries of the sub-region. 
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From what has been said throughout this report, it may be 
concluded that, although most of the planning organisms have 
taken at least partially into account the new internal and exter-
nal realities faced by their respective countries -e.g. by 
incorporating adjustment programmes in their medium-term forecasts-
they have continued to apply programming techniques and methods 
similar to those of the past. They have thereby deprived themselves 
of the possibility of drawing up formal documents containing 
forecasts considering perhaps shorter periods than those applied 
in plans drawn up in the 1970s. 
In effect, most of the developments here mentioned -confusion 
provoked by the crisis, the uncertain panorama, marked emphasis 
on the financial aspects of development- form part of changing 
pattern of circumstances which has in general imposed new demands 
on governments, and on planning systems in particular. In the 
face of such a variety of unforeseen developments, the response 
should also have been different from that traditionally forthcoming, 
but this has not always been the case, or has only been partially so. 
Deserving mention as a case involving notably different 
conditions is that of Nicaragua where criteria of economic policy 
have undergone an abrupt change as from July 197 9 and where, to the 
new external circumstances, has been added another different combi-
nation of circumstances on the internal front. However, even in 
that country the exercise of planning, at least during the initial 
years of the new "National Reconstruction" Government, has been of 
a conventional character, but with a growing involvement of the 
official planning agency in the economic scene in both the short 
and medium term. 
f) Conceptual polarization 
Although the degree of state intervention in an economy or 
the degree of liberality, wherein the market operates, do not in 
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themselves determine the significance of planning in a particular 
contest, the crisis and growing presence in the Region of important 
international financing organisms has provoked a kind of conceptual 
polarization in connection with the long-standing dilemma of state 
control versus the virtues of the market mechanism in attaining an 
optimum allocation of resources. 
Some planning agencies have endeavoured to avoid discussion 
in this connection and have carried out their activities in accord-« 
ance with the demands of the moment. Others, however, have 
responded with defensive positions tending to redtice the relative 
importance of the government in the economy, thereby revivifying 
the controversy and polarizing positions in connection with topics 
such as the rightful role of the State in an economy and that which 
is the responsibility of the planning function. 
Although the debate has so far proved relatively sterile, 
it has tended in one way or another to weaken some regional planning 
organisms: firstly, by having diverted their attention to defending 
themselves from attack by those social groups which accuse them 
of favouring state direction and control, and secondly because 
realism has proved stronger than theory, the economies not having 
evolved in conformity with preconceived prespcriptions but rather 
in accordance with the force of circumstances. Thus, although 
various international organisms have insisted that the Central 
American economies should open up their markets to international 
trade, these economies have in fact been isolating themselves from 
those influences in the light of acute shortages of foreign 
currency and the fact that, despite efforts to stimulate private 
investment, this has fallen to less than half the level recorded 
in the 1970s. The renewed force of these contrasting views and 
the growing polarization of positions of a somewhat doctrinaire 
character have complicated the already blurred panorama within 
which state planning action has evolved. 
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g) The rearrangement of objectives 
In view of the trends provoked by the crisis, the governments 
have had to re-examine their objectives. Past aims to attain 
sustained and significant growth within a concept of greater equity 
and less external dependence have been substituted by concerns to 
alternate the depressive situation or obviate its further adverse 
consequences. 
Thus, under the imperative need to solve prevailing financial 
imbalances it has been necessary to modify the objectives of economic 
policy and consequently alter the planning approach. Efforts linked 
with medium-term objectives in the real area of the economy have 
in this way gradually acquired less weight compared with those that 
have had to be dealt with to overcome cyclical setbacks. 
It should be pointed out however that -with differences of 
degree- most of the countries of the Region have concerned themselves 
with solving problems in the real area, especially in connection 
with foodstuffs and growing urban unemployment. The achievement 
of higher employment levels has been a primary objective of even 
greater importance than others in the priority category. 
During the last two years some countries have put into prac-
tice programmes aiming to alleviate the effects of the crisis and 
of adjustment policies on public welfare. Thus, for example,, a 
National Social Compensation Plan ("Plan Nacional de Compensación 
Social") was promoted in Costa Rica and top priority has been 
assigned in Honduras to national basic grain production and rural 
housing programmes. These initiatives, when not set in motion by 
the planning agencies have in any case been strongly supported by 
them. 
In general terms however the rearrangement of economic 
objectives as a result of the crisis has exceeded the posibility 
of formulating global and coherent plans in most of the countries 
concerned. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1 * The planning systems in the Central American Isthmus 
and historical conditions 
By the middle of the 197 0s the planning systems had become well 
established and institutionalized in all the countries of the 
Central American Isthmus. Their creation had in part been due to 
ECLA, and their functional legitimacy was consolidated by some 
international financing organisms, particularly in the context of 
the Alliance for Progress project in the 1960s. Some of the systems 
have been more closely associated than others with the economic 
sections of their respective governments while not all have been 
decisively influencing the activities of the public sector in 
matters of development. A tendency to raise the hierarchical 
significance of the systems within official organizational structures 
has nevertheless been observable over the past twenty years together 
with a continuous expansion of those activities and responsibilities 
(the programming of public investment, identification and prepar-
ation of projects, following up economic evolution and participating 
in the process of drawing up budgets and expenditure programmes) 
and, in general, the acknowledgement of the international community 
-especially of those entities operating in the fields of technical 
and financial co-operation- and by local entities closely concerned 
with national priorities. 
This has not of course meant that the exercise of planning 
has been free of difficulties, insufficiencies and severe restric-
tions. The process has in fact developed since its outset in an 
atmosphere of considerable economic and political limitations. 
With regard to the former, the Region's planners have often viewed 
their duties as somewhat technocratic and formal and have given 
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insufficient attention to their vital responsibility in the co-
ordination of points of view among the various organized groups 
connected with the fulfilment of objectives and of development 
goals. In addition, the relatively non-participative political 
structure of most Central American communities -Costa Rica being 
an exception in this instance- has hindered and in some cases 
inhibited the possibilities of dialogue and the conclusion of 
agreements between different social groups concerning the operation 
of economic policy and medium-term plans. These circumstances 
have influenced planning methods which have often been carried 
out as a technical and sometimes isolated activity. 
Its exercise has in many cases represented a normative and 
formal expression of the aspirations and points of view of 
technical specialists, the latter being manifest in the objectives, 
strategies, policies and instruments envisaged by them which in 
most instances have included criteria and considerations of a 
political nature, especially when stemming from the government 
in the exercise of their authority. In certain stages of its 
development (which has in general grown progressively weaker) the 
practice of planning has included a significant content involving 
the ratification of public action vis-a-vis the community and 
arranging the order of investments in line with internal financing 
availabilities. 
Causing further difficulties has been the view held by 
some technical specialists and organized groups that the "Plan" 
is an expression of consensus already arrived at in the conduct o 
of public administration rather than a starting point in the 
harmonization of interests. Formal plans have not always reflected 
an irrevocable determination on the part of the governments to 
carry them forward nor their capacity to see them through. The 
constant influence of national pressure groups and of interests 
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allien to the sub-region have similarly conditioned the adoption 
of decisions in economic and social policies and hampered possibil-
ities of formulating and implementing strategies and projects. 
In addition, the concept of development and approach to 
economic processes underlying the financing and co-operation 
policies of some bilateral and multinacional organisms have in 
many cases constituted ingredients that have also detracted from 
the autonomy of the planning system in the design and execution of 
development plans and strategies, although there have also been 
occasions when the system has been strenghtened as a result of 
being assigned a role in the procurement of external resources. 
From an economic viewpoint, and given the high degree of 
liberality of the economies of the Isthmus, mention should perhaps 
be made -as one of the main conditioning factors in planning- of 
the scant control exercised by the Central American authorities 
on external demand, this being the main variable involved in the 
above context. This autonomous element of exposure to interna-
tional economic conditions, frequently unstable in terms of price 
and volume, has introduced such a degree of uncertainty in the 
planning process that it has hindered the establishment of reliable 
goals and sometimes detracted from the merit of efforts made to 
quantify some guidelines such as in the medium term. 
Finally, the technical capacity of the international organisms 
referred to has varied considerably in the course of time as well 
as between one country and another. Significant technical resources 
have in some cases been concentrated in a planning organism 
possessing the necessary motivation and leadership to influence 
the adoption of decisions. In other instances, the planning 
offices have shown intrinsic technical weaknesses. Although some 
have had adequate technical resources at their disposal, they 
have not always managed to establish appropriate systems of 
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communication between them -which have ultimately become converted 
into a kind of "technocratic enclave"- and the centres of decision 
in the governments concerned. 
To sump up, planning in most of the Central American countries 
has seemingly been carried out at much more modest levels of action 
than those observed in the rest of Latin America. 
By the end of the 1970s the characteristics of the practice of 
planning in the sub-region could be summed up as follows: while it was 
of an imperative nature for the public sector, it was regarded as indic-
ative only by other "économie agents; it was all-inclusive in character 
since it was endeavouring to plan the activities of all the sectors 
comprising the global economic scene although it failed to analyse 
sufficiently the particular realities of the sector producing 
goods and services; it was insufficiently participative; its polit-
ical and economic viability was limited; it concentrated mainly on 
the real area of the economy and gave scant consideration to 
financial variables other than in fiscal respects which were in 
general also taken into account in annual operation plans. On the 
other hand the planning systems as a general rule were lacking in 
necessary constitutive elements such as systems of information, of 
reconciling different approaches, as well as of organic consultation 
and participation. 
They nevertheless frequently fulfilled significant roles in 
the introduction of ideas more consistent with effective national 
interests; they generated research into certain Central American 
problems and circumstances, and put forward opinions and optional 
development proposals which to some extent influenced the evolution 
of the national communities involved, or at least aroused discussion 
in these respects within their respective governments. 
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2. Effects of the crisis on the planning process 
The commencement of the crisis confronted the planning systems 
with fresh challenges and tensions. If doubts were already felt 
concerning the suitability of the type of formal planning being 
carried out in normal times, these were fully confirmed in the 
context of uncertainty and confusion to which the crisis gave 
rise. The absence of a medium-term outlook totally invalidated 
past prospective plans while very short-term demands distracted 
attention from transformation strategies towards those involving 
mere survival in an adverse and hostile international economic 
environment. The urgency to attend to serious and constantly 
worsening difficulties in the financial sector caused the impor-
tance of other national entities involved in those problems to 
grow (economic or finance ministries, central banks, etc.), and 
implicitly weakened those most directly concerned with productive 
activities and the real area of the economy, as well as between 
the latter and the planning agencies. 
In addition, action by the public sector had diminished in 
the face of financial restrictions caused by the crisis. There 
was less expenditure to programme (especially in terms of capital 
investment), and in some countries the role of the public sector 
as the leading force in development tended to wane, at times due 
to the force of circumsntances and at others on account of 
deliberate decisions connected with stabilization programmes. 
Finally, the crisis has made it more difficult to reconcile 
or harmonize differing interests, even within the government 
structures themselves. How, for example, distribute the necessary 
reduction in public expenditure over the various official 
dependencies? Or, in the case of relationships with organized 
groups, how distribute the scant availability of foreign currency 
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or offer some selective alleviation to enterprises in the throes 
of insolvency? The effects of the crisis on possibilities of 
reconciling interests have undoubtedly been dispersive in character. 
These difficulties have not lessened the potential impor-
tance of planning but have in fact enhanced it. They have never-
theless tended to weaken most of the planning systems in the 
Isthmus which have not managed to adapt with sufficiently agility 
to the new circumstances that in the period 1981-1982 quickly 
invaded the economic scene throughout the sub-region. In other 
words, events have appreciably exceeded action on the part of 
the planning systems -and in the application of economic policy 
in general- causing vacuums that have aggravated the generalized 
confusion and made it difficult to react in the face of the new 
and adverse factors obstructing economic activity. 
The economic situation has thus become extremely unstable 
and economic forecasts technically difficult. To the usual inherent 
limitations in various countries affecting the drawing up of 
forecasts and medium-term forecasts 24/ have been added in recent 
years the contractions of the external sector due to growing 
protectionist measures which have given rise to doubts with regard 
to the stability of the international economy and have tended to 
reflect the considerable transformations taking place in the latter 
-a trend that has hitherto been of scant or no benefit to 
24/ Forecasts have customarily taken scant account of some 
economic or technical cycles as, for instance, in agriculture, 
and little consideration has been given to national execution 
capacity or international restrictions affecting credit 
disbursements. The same circumstance has applied to other factors 
such as the fortuitous effects of climatic changes. 
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outlying markets. The latter have in fact had to absorb a dispro-
portionately large share of the cost of adjustment in their attempts 
to lessen the impact of the crisis.25/ 
The depth and persistence of the crisis have - demanded prompt 
responses which not even the institutions traditionally linked 
with the management of short-term policy have been able to supply. 
The chronic external breach has consequently become an extremely 
critical problem. The financial manifestations of the crisis, in 
particular the shortages of foreign exchange, have: made it essential 
to attach greater importance to external financing despite inducing 
the governments to receive credits without sufficient evaluation 
of the projects for which they were intended. The study of prior-
ities has been increasingly concentrated on the need to procure 
foreign exchange, leaving as a secondary consideration the consistency 
of projects with long-term national objectives. 
By contrast, the urgency to obtain foreign credit has tended 
to enhance the importance of bilateral and multilateral financing 
sources and at the same time increase their influence and possibil-
ities of conditioning economic policy, in some cases not only in 
terms of the use and destination of resources but also of formu-
lating economic and social policy measures, barely or in no way 
linked with the financing involved. 
Under these conditions the Central American economies have 
become more vulnerable and their scope for manoeuvre in the 
execution of national economic policies has been adversely affected. 
25/ Concerning this aspect, see the studies of Keith Griffin, 
Notas sobre los problemas aictuales de la economía mundial, and 
Robert Boyer, La crisis de la planeacion y/o ¿La planeación como 
apoyo para salir de la crisis? Submitted at the international 
seminar on Planning in Times of Crisis held in Mexico City from 
26 to 28 July 1984. 
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The search for and achievement of co-ordination and consensus in 
economic and social policies have thus been even more arduous than 
in the past. 
The absence of guidelines and firm propositions observed in 
most of the countries under review has given rise to internal 
discussion and encouraged the generation of dispersed initiatives 
stemming from different social groups and, in many instances, the 
adoption of policies of adjustment and proposals not always 
consistent with national realities. Strategies of a liberalistic 
type have thus arisen spontaneously and acquired force aiming to 
establish greater linkages with external markets and thereby 
running counter to the need to formulate possible measures to 
stimulate internal markets. 
This situation has in some cases led to planning losing to 
some extent its role of ratifying public sector activity in the 
eyes of the community due to an accentuation of criticism on the 
part of some entrepreneurial groups with regard to planning, and 
State intervention in the economy. It has also led to a loss of 
confidence and credibility among other sectors concerning the 
planning system and even given rise to scepticism within technical 
planning groups themselves. 
The tendency to weaken the planning systems -specifically 
the national planning offices- has in some cases, accentuated by 
the crisis, induced other institutions to question some of the 
functions traditionally carried out by the former -for example the 
co-ordination of external financial and technical co-operation-
and diluted their influence in other respects. 
3. Reaction of the planning systems to the crisis 
Faced by the crisis, the Region's planning systems have responded 
in different ways. Some have persevered in the traditional 
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exercise of duties and activities relating to medium and short-
term planning, applying the same objectives and strategies as 
hitherto, but partially modifying goals and emphasizing priority 
areas linked with food supplies and the satisfaction of basic 
needs. In most of the countries (Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and El Salvador), albeit with differing emphasis and contents, 
urgent plans have been drawn up involving activities tending to 
attain these ends. To the traditional objectives of growth and 
income distribution have been added in some cases those of economic 
and financial stabilization, although without explicitly estab-
lishing priorities or considering their mutual consistency. 
Other planning institutions have abandoned their traditional 
activities concerned with the formulation of medium-term mechanisms 
and guidelines and in some cases have embarked on a search for 
ways of facing the crisis. This has sometimes coincided with a 
high level of activity and relatively ample participation in the 
tasks of analysis, formulation of measures and adoption of decisions 
with regard to the principal manifestations of the crisis, i.e., 
unemployment of human resources and installed capacity, foreign-
exchange restrictions and public sector deficits in both the 
central government and decentralized institutions. 
Also deserving mention in this context have been the various 
partial reactions to the crisis adopted by the planning offices 
which to a certain extent have differed from those described 
above. In some countries administrative and legislative reform 
initiatives or others relating to changes in the relationship of 
those offices with the rest of the public sector have been 
promoted with a view to adjusting the system to the new demands 
of the crisis and endeavouring to consolidate or expand its duties 
and institutional role, particularly in the decision-making 
mechanisms. In other cases the attention of the national planning 
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office has been largely devoted to the development of regional 
and local planning (as in Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica) 
either through the medium of new institutional mechanisms and 
legal instruments or the formulation of integrated rural develop-
ment projects. Participation by the communities concerned in the 
formulation and execution of national development plans and projects 
has frequently arisen in a parallel manner to the emphasis given 
to regional and local topics. 
In the particular case of Nicaragua, planning has in recent 
years acquired greater significance in the light of the dramatic 
situation of conflict and economic and financial crisis prevailing 
in that country. In this respect the Ministry of Planning has 
directed its efforts to the development of new planning instruments 
and methods not previously resorted to in Central America: the 
use of manual labour balances, material inputs and financial 
resources, mechanisms designed to increase popular participation 
in national and regional terms and at sectoral and individual 
company levels, above all in the so-called "people's property area" 
The formulation of programmes by product, involving the various 
stages of primary production, industrial transformation and 
marketing is another of the mechanisms -in this case of an 
operational nature-, introduced in the Nicar&guan planning system. 
Even in this case, however, the system has revealed insufficiencies, 
notwithstanding its hierarchical position in the institutional 
context and the undoubted political support accorded to it. 
To sum up, therefore, virtually all the planning systems 
have shown some degree of acknowledgement that the methods and 
instruments used in the past -whose efficacy has even been 
questioned in less abnormal times- are inadequate in present 
circumstances. Attempts have been made to involve many of the 
systems in situational problems, but not always in seeking ways 
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of harmonizing the short-term with explicit or implicit long-term 
aims. It has also been recognized throughout the Region that 
traditional forms would mostly be unsatisfactory to meet present-
day problems. This acknowledgment may prove to be the starting 
point for those systems to adapt their procedures to the radically 
different circumstances now facing the sub-region. 
4. Somes lessons learned 
The experiences described in the preceding pages demonstrate that 
the planning systems held in greatest esteem in their respective 
countries have achieved this situation thanks mainly to their 
collaboration with government departments responsible for adopting 
decisions in economic policy matters and especially to their 
efforts to harmonize interests within the public sector and between 
the latter and other sectors of the community. Thus, the ministries 
and organisms that take a hand in drawing up the national budget, 
financial programming, negotiations in connection with external 
indebtedness and the allocation of priorities in government expend-
iture continue to exert a leading role in their respective 
governments. From this it should not be concluded that these 
ministries should concentrate their activity on dealing with the 
prevailing cyclical situation. It should instead be inferred 
that they should not exclude short-term concerns from their 
numerous responsibilities but should rather reconcile them with 
long-term aims. 
In the second place, the adjustment or stabilization policies 
themselves, whether adopted due to the force of circumstances or 
as the result of formal arrangements with the International Monetary 
Fund, far from isolating the planning organisms create possible 
lines of endeavour capable of enhancing their performance. Expense-
paring policies demand a selective approach and the planning systems 
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are in an advantageous position to establish in this respect an 
order of priorities consistent with specific objectives. Shortages 
of foreign exchange also call for the establishment of priorities 
normally exceeding the field of responsibilities of the central 
banks. The imperative need to expand exports also demands defini-
tions and priorities: in this connection it would be more sensible 
to elect a limited number of items likely to achieve rapid access 
to external markets than try to promote all export lines at the 
same time; even to support those selected items makes it necessary 
carefully to elect instruments and incentive policies. Export 
efforts demand efficiency on the part of the public sector as well 
as the business enterprises involved. All the foregoing concerns 
provide a field of action that should on no account be overlooked 
by the planning systems. There is therefore certainly no intrinsic 
contradiction between short-term economic policies and long-term 
planning nor between attributing greater relative importance to 
market developments and the need to foster a planning system. It 
will however in all cases be necessary to adapt programming to the 
new circumstances. 
Thirdly, short-term pressures have been such that the 
advisability of examining medium and long-term options has been 
virtually ignored. This is a natural field of action for planning 
systems, not so much in order to devise sole solutions as to 
provoke discussion within each government and at the national level 
concerning optional ways of overcoming the crisis. 2j5/ This work 
is at present all the more necessary in the light of the environ-
ment of confusion besetting the governments and economic agents in 
26/ This activity at the national level also applies to 
horizontal co-operation at the sub-regional level. 
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general and in order to respond to the pattern offered to the 
countries of the Central American Isthmus by important external 
entities. It would also assist in imparting a certain direction 
and consistency to every-day economic policy. 
Finally, the planning organisms explicitly acknowledging 
the magnitude and scope of the changes that have taken place in 
the Region in recent years will be better able to respond to the 
new challenges. There is clearly little sense in formulating 
formal medium-term plans in the light of current uncertainties. 
The same lack of reality applies to any insistence on simulta-
neous fulfiment of the same development objectives as in the 
past. The exploration of new forms of planning (as,for example, 
the "strategic" and "situational" formulae being tested in one 
way or another in Mexico and Venezuela), the assignment of 
priority to efforts to promote and seek consensus in the economic 
sphere, the review of objectives in the light of changing circum-
stances, the examination of new courses of action to enable 
intervention in budget and financial programming, the abandonment 
of too all-embracing lines of endeavour and their replacement by 
more pragmatic and flexible approaches, are all tasks providing 
the possibility of reinforcing or, where appropriate, recovering 
the level of esteem formerly held by planning systems, and of 
assigning them a preponderant role in the general field of 
economic and social development. 
